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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a decision feared by some as “the end of all morals 
legislation,”1 the majority in Lawrence v. Texas held that “the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding 
a law prohibiting the practice.”2 Since deciding Lawrence, the 
Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to opine definitively 
whether a law passed exclusively on moral grounds can pass the 
 
 1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2. Id. at 577 (majority opinion) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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rational basis test—that is, whether public morality in itself is a 
legitimate governmental interest.3 Instead, the battle has played out 
in circuit, district, and state courts across the country. While some 
courts have held—fulfilling Justice Scalia’s doomsday prophecy—that 
public morality is an insufficient reason for a legislature to pass a law, 
others have narrowed the Lawrence holding and effectively revived 
morals legislation from imminent death.4 
The first post-Lawrence “morals legislation” to create a genuine 
circuit split that could potentially reach the High Court relates to 
“device[s] designed or marketed as useful primarily for the 
stimulation of human genital organs”5—in essence, sex toys. With no 
pretext other than protecting public morality, legislatures in at least 
eight states have passed laws prohibiting the commercial sale and 
distribution of sex toys.6 Although these laws might be 
“uncommonly silly,”7 the question remains whether these 
legislatures, citing only public morality, have a rational basis for 
passing such legislation. 
The two circuits to have addressed these laws are split as to their 
constitutionality.8 The first circuit to visit the issue—the Eleventh 
 
 3. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (holding that a 
statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so long as “there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification” made in the 
statute); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (distinguishing for the 
first time between rational basis and strict scrutiny). 
 4. For lower court cases questioning the validity of specific morals legislation, see 
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005) (invalidating as unconstitutional a law 
criminalizing fornication between unmarried persons), and In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (“Basing legislation on moral disapproval of same-sex couples may 
be questionable in light of Lawrence.”). For cases upholding morals legislation in light of 
Lawrence, see State v. Jenkins, No. C-040111, 2004 WL 3015091 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) 
(upholding an obscenity law as not violating substantive due process of adult video store 
owner) and Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL 
3154530, at *12 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (“[S]tatutes rationally related to furthering the 
legislatively determined ‘public morality’ are constitutional.”). 
 5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (2010). 
 6. For a list of descriptions of statutes criminalizing the commercial sale and 
distribution of adult toys, see Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740–41 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
 7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that his duty was to 
decide cases in line with the Constitution, even though he felt that the law at issue was 
“uncommonly silly”) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting)). 
 8. Compare Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 740–41 (striking down a law prohibiting 
the sale of sex toys as unconstitutional in light of Lawrence v. Texas), with Williams v. Morgan 
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Circuit—distinguished Lawrence and upheld an Alabama statute 
criminalizing the sale of adult toys.9 The Fifth Circuit, only one year 
later, disagreed and interpreted Lawrence broadly to strike down a 
Texas sex toy statute.10 
This Comment agrees with the Eleventh Circuit and argues for 
the constitutionality of morals legislation criminalizing the 
commercial distribution of adult toys, thus avoiding the bleak world 
envisioned by Justice Scalia in which there is constitutional 
protection for “fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, 
and obscenity.”11 A law banning the sale of sex toys is constitutional 
under the Due Process Clause because it does not implicate a 
fundamental right and because bare public morality12 in itself remains 
in some instances a legitimate government interest. This Comment 
will begin in Part II by detailing the relevant portions of the 
Lawrence decision and its implications for morals legislation. Part III 
will look at the circuit split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
regarding the constitutionality of sex toy laws in light of Lawrence. 
Part IV will then analyze the constitutionality of the statutes at issue, 
concluding that laws banning the sale of sex toys are constitutional 
because (1) they do not implicate a fundamental right and (2) they 
serve the legitimate government interest of promoting public 
morality under the rational basis test. Part V will briefly conclude. 
II. CONTEXT & BACKGROUND: LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
The facts of Lawrence are not complicated, but what could have 
been a simple holding invalidating a law criminalizing homosexual 
sodomy on any number of grounds has instead potentially triggered 
a new era of morality-free lawmaking. In Lawrence, after being 
 
(Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a law prohibiting the sale of 
sex toys as constitutional). 
 9. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1318. 
 10. Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 740. 
 11. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. When this Comment speaks about bare public morality, it is referring to what other 
authors have referred to as “religious morality.” Although I disagree with the idea that all 
morality stems from religion (and the idea that moral legislation is unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause as suggested by one author), when I speak about bare public morality I 
am referring to that which is done based solely on the reigning majority opinion—not any sort 
of “universal” morality. See generally Justin P. Nichols, Comment, The Hidden Dichotomy in 
the Law of Morality, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591 (2009); Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation 
and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2003). 
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dispatched to a private residence to investigate a possible weapons 
disturbance, police officers observed two men engaged in a 
prohibited sexual act.13 The men were prosecuted under a Texas 
statute criminalizing “any contact between any part of the genitals of 
one [man] and the mouth or anus of another.”14 After being 
convicted and having their convictions upheld by a Texas appeals 
court,15 the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that 
the Texas statute criminalizing only homosexual sodomy was 
unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 
A number of years earlier, the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick had 
reviewed a similar Georgia statute criminalizing all sodomy, both 
homosexual and heterosexual.17 In holding that public morality was a 
sufficient basis for the Georgia legislature to enact such a law, the 
Court reasoned, “The law . . . is constantly based on notions of 
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to 
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts would be 
very busy indeed.”18 
The Lawrence decision took little time in explicitly overruling 
Bowers. Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion by recognizing 
that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom 
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”19 The 
Court held that the intimate conduct protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment included that which was criminalized by the Texas 
sodomy statute.20 In overruling Bowers, the Court adopted the 
language of Justice Stevens’s Bowers dissent: “[T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice . . . .”21 
In an attempt to rely on the Bowers precedent, the state of Texas 
offered public morality as its sole justification for the statute.22 
 
 13. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63. 
 14. Id. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1), -06(a) (West 2003)). 
 15. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
 16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
 17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 18. Id. at 196. 
 19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 20. Id. at 567. 
 21. Id. at 578 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 22. Id. 
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However, because the Court overruled Bowers—making Bowers no 
longer controlling precedent—the State’s argument was defeated 
and the law was struck down. Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
“[t]he Texas statute further[ed] no legitimate state interest which 
[could] justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”23 Many commentators have taken this statement to 
imply that public morality is never a legitimate state interest and thus 
will never satisfy the rational basis test.24  
The Court appears, though, to have qualified its holding. In a 
possible attempt to dispel doomsday fears, Justice Kennedy 
explained: 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not 
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether 
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship 
that homosexual persons seek to enter.25 
This opinion was met with an aggressive dissent by Justice 
Scalia.26 Justice Scalia began by emphasizing that most of the 
majority opinion has no relevance to its actual holding that the Texas 
statute furthers no legitimate state interest that can justify its 
application to the petitioners under rational basis review.27 One of 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Sonu Bedi, Repudiating Morals Legislation: Rendering the Constitutional Right 
to Privacy Obsolete, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 447 (2005); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based 
Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 
1235 (2004) (recognizing that instead of eliminating morality from lawmaking, “Lawrence 
reflected the Court’s long-standing jurisprudential discomfort with explicit morals-based 
rationales for lawmaking”); Mitchell F. Park, Comment, Defining One’s Own Concept of 
Existence and the Meaning of the Universe: The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas, 
2006 BYU L. REV. 837. For scholarship espousing the view that Lawrence did not “sound the 
death knell for most forms of ‘morals legislation,’” see John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional 
Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2009) and Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits 
on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious 
Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2006) (“[E]xplicit reliance on moral rationales for 
law should not be banished altogether from the realm of legitimate government interests.”). 
 25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 26. Id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice O’Connor concurred in 
the judgment but felt instead that the statute ought to be invalidated based on the Equal 
Protection Clause and not the Due Process Clause. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
This, in my opinion, would have been a much less controversial means of striking down this 
statute.  
 27. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia’s primary criticisms was the majority’s failure to 
establish whether the right at issue was a fundamental right.28 Justice 
Scalia concluded that, even though not specifically stated by the 
majority, the right to certain sexual intimacy was not a fundamental 
right—and essentially, without specifically stating, the majority 
applied the rational basis test.29 In expressing his disapproval of such 
a quick overruling of Bowers, Justice Scalia argued that certain laws, 
like those against “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, . . . bestiality, and obscenity,” are only constitutional if 
morals legislation remains valid.30 To Justice Scalia, this ruling 
represented “a massive disruption of the current social order.”31 It is 
in light of this decision, and the potential for this disruption, that 
courts have become split on the constitutionality of legislation passed 
only on the grounds of public morality, or “morals legislation.” 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Laws prohibiting the sale of—but not the use of—sex toys have 
been passed in at least eight states.32 A number of state courts have 
addressed the constitutionality of the statutes, and these courts are 
split as to their constitutionality.33 Some of these states, however, 
addressed these laws before Lawrence was decided. Post-Lawrence, 
two circuits have addressed two substantively identical laws (one 
from Alabama and the other from Texas) and have come out on 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 590. 
 31. Id. at 591. 
 32. The states include: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Texas, and Virginia. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
 33. The states with sex toy statutes currently in force are Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Virginia. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2010); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-373 (2009). The highest courts of both Alabama and Mississippi have 
upheld their respective state statutes against constitutional challenges. 1568 Montgomery 
Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 2009 WL 2903458 (Ala. 2009); PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 
2d 1244 (Miss. 2004). The Virginia Supreme Court has not yet had a chance to review its 
state’s statute. Louisiana, Kansas, and Colorado have all enacted similar obscene-devices 
statutes, but their respective state supreme courts struck them down as being unconstitutional. 
State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64 (La. 2004); State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990); 
People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985). 
Georgia also passed a similar statute, but it was struck down by the Eleventh Circuit because it 
infringed free speech rights. This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 
439 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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opposite ends of the spectrum. This Comment will now consider 
these two circuit cases. 
A. Alabama and Williams v. Morgan 
In 1998, Alabama began criminalizing the sale and distribution 
of certain sexual and obscene devices. Specifically, the Alabama code 
prohibits the distribution of “any device designed or marketed as 
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.”34 The 
statute exempts sales of devices “for a bona fide medical, scientific, 
educational, legislative, judicial, or law enforcement purpose.”35 The 
statute does not, however, prohibit the possession, use, or gratuitous 
distribution of these kinds of obscene devices.36 Six plaintiffs—both 
as sellers and users of sexual devices—brought an action seeking to 
enjoin the Attorney General of the State of Alabama from enforcing 
the statute.37 The plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed upon 
their “fundamental right to privacy and personal autonomy” under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.38  
This case has an extensive procedural history. Following a bench 
trial, the district court held that there was no fundamental right to 
use sexual devices established in the Constitution.39 The court then 
proceeded to scrutinize the statute under rational basis review. The 
court enjoined enforcement of the statute, concluding that the 
statute lacked any rational basis—public morality being the only basis 
having been promoted.40 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit in 2001, 
which was prior to the Lawrence decision, the court reversed the 
district court’s conclusion that the statute lacked a rational basis and 
held that the promotion and preservation of public morality 
provided a rational basis.41 However, the action was remanded to the 
district court to determine if the plaintiff’s as-applied fundamental-
rights challenge had merit.42  
 
 34. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (2010). 
 35. Id. § 13A-12-200.4. 
 36. Id. § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). 
 37. Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 1999). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1283. 
 40. Id. at 1293. 
 41. Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 952 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 42. Id. at 955. 
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On remand, the district court again struck down the statute, 
finding that it failed strict scrutiny.43 The court held that the 
Constitution established a fundamental right to sexual privacy—one 
which was deeply rooted in the history and traditions of our nation.44 
Furthermore, the district court found that the right to sexual privacy 
does in fact “encompass a right to use sexual devices” like those 
marketed by the plaintiffs in the case.45 Thus, the district court 
concluded that the statute unconstitutionally burdened the right to 
use sexual devices within private adult, consensual sexual 
relationships.46 It was after this opinion that Lawrence was decided.47 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals once again reversed the 
district court, holding that there was no pre-existing, fundamental, 
substantive-due-process right to sexual privacy triggering strict 
scrutiny.48 Furthermore, the court held that Lawrence did not 
recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy, and it refused to 
create such a right.49 With strict scrutiny no longer available, the 
court remanded again to the district court to examine whether 
public morality remained a valid rational basis in light of Lawrence 
overruling Bowers.50 
On remand, the district court decided “not [to] invalidate the 
Alabama law . . . simply because it [was] founded on concerns over 
public morality.”51 Quoting Lawrence, the district court agreed that 
eliminating public morality as a rational basis for legislation would 
cause “a ‘massive disruption of the current social order,’ one this 
court is not willing to set into motion.”52 The court concluded that 
this case was distinguishable from Lawrence such that Lawrence did 
not compel striking down the Alabama law.53 
 
 43. Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1307 (N.D. Ala. 2002), 
rev’d, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 44. Id. at 1296. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 48. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
49. Id. at 1238. 
 50. Id. at 1238 n.9. 
 51. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2006), 
aff’d, 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 52. Id. at 1249–50 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 53. Id. at 1253. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:02:10 PM 
1369 Unraveling Lawrence’s Concerns About Legislated Morality 
 1377 
By the third time the controversy reached the circuit court, the 
only question remaining was “whether public morality remain[ed] a 
sufficient rational basis for the challenged statute after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.”54 The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the holding of the district court that the statute survived 
rational basis scrutiny because public morality remained a legitimate 
governmental interest, even in light of the majority’s language in 
Lawrence.55 
The court began its analysis by determining that the statute in 
question was subject to rational basis review. In Williams IV, the 
court held that the Supreme Court had “declined the invitation” to 
recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy, even though it had 
numerous opportunities to do so.56 Thus, strict scrutiny was not 
available and the law would be upheld if it “[bore] a rational relation 
to some legitimate end.”57 The court emphasized the fact that a 
statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so long as 
“‘there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 
a rational basis for the [statute].’”58 Thus, under rational basis review 
a statute bears “a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking 
the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to 
negative every conceivable basis which might support it. . . . [I]t is 
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived 
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the 
legislature.”59 
Citing numerous Supreme Court decisions, the court reiterated 
that “[t]he crafting and safeguarding of public morality has long 
been an established part of the States’ plenary police power to 
legislate and indisputably is a legitimate government interest under 
rational basis scrutiny.”60 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
 
 54. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(citations omitted). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
 57. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1320. 
 58. Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 
 59. Id. at 1320–21 (quoting FCC, 508 U.S. at 314–15).  
 60. Id. at 1321 (quoting Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 
2001) (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (citing Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 
(1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957))). 
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that Lawrence ended all morals legislation, arguing that “while the 
statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized private sexual conduct,” the 
Alabama statute forbade “public, commercial activity.”61 The court 
limited the language in Lawrence to only certain cases: “To the 
extent Lawrence rejects public morality as a legitimate government 
interest, it invalidates only those laws that target conduct that is both 
private and non-commercial.”62 The court emphasized the public 
and commercial element of the activity criminalized by the Alabama 
statute, arguing bluntly, “There is nothing ‘private’ or ‘consensual’ 
about the advertising and sale of a dildo.”63 
B. Texas and Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle 
In 2008, the Fifth Circuit decided a separate case involving a 
similar statute. Fortunately, the history behind this case is 
significantly less complex. In 1979, the Texas legislature amended its 
obscenity statute to prohibit the “promotion” of “obscene devices,” 
which included selling, giving, lending, distributing, or advertising 
for them.64 Thus, the Texas statute was broader than the Alabama 
statute because even lending or gratuitously giving an obscene device 
was criminal. Like the Alabama statute, however, the Texas statute 
did not criminalize the use or possession of such a device.65 Similar 
to the Alabama statute at issue in William VI, “obscene device” was 
defined as any device “designed or marketed as useful primarily for 
the stimulation of human genital organs.”66 A number of years later, 
the legislature carved out an exception for individuals who promoted 
obscene devices for “a bona fide medical, psychiatric, judicial, 
legislative, or law enforcement purpose.”67 
Two plaintiffs who engaged in the retail distribution of sexual 
devices filed a declaratory action to enjoin the enforcement of the 
statute, alleging that it violated “the substantive liberty rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the commercial speech 
 
 61. Id. at 1322. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (quoting Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 
n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 64. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 2008). 
65.  Id. at 741. 
 66. Id. at 740–41 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7) (Vernon 1979)). 
 67. Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.23(g) (Vernon 1993)). 
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rights protected by the First Amendment.”68 The district court 
dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Constitution did not 
protect the right to publicly promote sexual devices. The case was 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.69  
The circuit court addressed the due process argument first, 
concluding that the asserted governmental interests did not meet the 
constitutional standard announced in Lawrence for laws affecting the 
right to engage in private intimate conduct in the home without 
government intrusion.70 First, the court reasoned that “restricting 
the ability to purchase an item is tantamount to restricting that 
item’s use.”71 Furthermore, the fact that it was even illegal to lend or 
give a sexual device to another person undercut the argument that 
the statute only affected public conduct.72 Instead, this statute 
unconstitutionally restricted “the exercise of the constitutional right 
to engage in private intimate conduct in the home free from 
government intrusion.”73 
In interpreting the Lawrence decision, the court refused to 
address whether the right at issue merited strict or rational basis 
scrutiny.74 Instead, it opined that it was only necessary to apply the 
Lawrence decision directly to this statute without trying to read 
anything more into it, and, based on the holding in Lawrence, this 
statute was unconstitutional as well.75 The court concluded, “Thus, if 
in Lawrence public morality was an insufficient justification for a law 
that restricted ‘adult consensual intimacy in the home,’ then public 
morality also cannot serve as a rational basis for Texas’s statute, 
which also regulates private sexual intimacy.”76 Because the statute 
had already been held unconstitutional, the court did not sufficiently 
analyze the First Amendment claims.77 The State petitioned for a 
rehearing en banc but was denied.78  
 
 68. Id. at 742. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 743. 
 71. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683–91 (1977)). 
 72. Id. at 744. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 744–45. 
 76. Id. at 745. 
 77. Id. at 747. 
 78. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008) (denying 
rehearing en banc). 
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEX TOY STATUTES 
The differences in the reasoning between the Williams VI court 
and the Reliable Consultants court demonstrate the ambiguity of the 
Lawrence decision and how reasonable minds can differ on the 
subject of public morality in laws. After Lawrence, a number of 
commentators attempted to dispel Justice Scalia’s fears that the 
majority’s holding would be the end of morals legislation, including 
government police power over polygamy, adult incest, bestiality, and 
the like.79 Most commentators argued that the government would be 
able to continue regulating such behavior because doing so was 
justified on grounds other than public morality.80 This Comment 
attempts to do the opposite, arguing instead that there remain a 
number of areas of law justified only on public morality grounds, and 
the majority in Lawrence had no intention of ending government 
regulation in every moral realm. Instead, even the Lawrence majority 
would have a difficult time extending its holding, as was done in 
Reliable Consultants, to eliminate laws such as those prohibiting the 
sale of sex toys. 
This Comment will build on the Williams VI decision and give 
the full analysis of why laws banning the sale of sex toys—passed 
solely on grounds of public morality—are constitutional. This 
analysis begins with a determination of the level of scrutiny that must 
be afforded the statute. Because the right to sexual privacy has not 
been established as a fundamental right, the law is only due rational 
basis scrutiny.81 As such, the analysis turns to whether public 
morality alone is a sufficient rational basis on which to enact the law. 
In concluding that bare public morality here satisfies the rational 
basis test, the discussion will look at both the history of morals 
 
 79. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 12; Nichols, supra note 12. 
 80. For example, one commentator argued that polygamy would still be illegal because 
the government has an interest in promoting monogamous marriages (and also an interest in 
protecting scarce government financial resources). Joseph Bozzuti, Note, The Constitutionality 
of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. 
LAW. 409, 433–41 (2004). Incest would still be illegal because the government has a 
legitimate interest in preventing conception in a manner that increases the risk of the birth of 
children with handicaps. See Philip G. Peters, Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State 
Regulation of Reproductive Liberty, in HARMING FUTURE PERSONS: ETHICS, GENETICS AND 
THE NONIDENTITY PROBLEM 317, 329 (Melinda A. Roberts & David T. Wasserman eds., 
2009). 
 81. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 
319–20 (1993)). 
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legislation, including the Supreme Court’s past acceptance of morals 
laws, and the differences between the laws at issue in Lawrence and 
the laws under scrutiny here. 
A. Level of Scrutiny for the Right to Sexual Privacy at Issue 
In determining the constitutionality of these statutes, the first—
and perhaps most important—determination is the level of scrutiny 
to be applied. Although many commentators have argued that 
Lawrence established a fundamental right to sexual privacy,82 the 
Eleventh Circuit was correct in concluding that the holding of 
Lawrence was more limited and, as such, sex toy laws are only due 
rational basis scrutiny.83 The Court in Lawrence failed to definitively 
establish a fundamental right to sexual privacy through a Glucksberg 
analysis.84 Furthermore, the Court has never held that sexual privacy 
in itself is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. Instead, 
when establishing fundamental rights related to children and 
procreation, the Court has defined such rights too narrowly to 
encompass the kinds of statutes at issue here. Thus, only the rational 
basis test should be applied to the sex toy laws at issue. 
1. The absence of a Glucksberg analysis in Lawrence 
It is established Supreme Court due process jurisprudence that a 
Glucksberg analysis is the proper method for determining whether a 
right is fundamental.85 The Glucksberg analysis comes from the 
Supreme Court case of Washington v. Glucksberg, in which the Court 
unanimously held that a right to assistance in committing suicide was 
not protected by the Due Process Clause.86 The Court’s reasoning 
focused on the fact that a right to assisted suicide was not a 
fundamental liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
thus was only due rational basis scrutiny.87 Because the legislature 
 
 82. For a description of some of the arguments made in favor of Lawrence establishing a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy, see Daniel Allender, Note, Applying Lawrence: Teenagers 
and the Crime Against Nature, 58 DUKE L.J. 1825 (2009). 
 83. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 84. See id. at 1319. 
 85. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 86. Id. at 728. 
 87. Id. 
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had a legitimate interest in enacting the law—the preservation of 
human life—the law was held to be constitutional.88 
Glucksberg reiterated the established two-part analysis to 
determine whether a liberty interest was “fundamental.” First, a 
court must carefully formulate the interest at stake.89 Second, the 
court must determine whether that interest is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history.”90 Only those interests deeply rooted in the 
nation’s history are fundamental rights deserving of strict scrutiny.91 
All other rights warrant only rational basis review.92 
As pointed out by Justice Scalia in his dissent, the Lawrence 
majority did not carefully formulate the interest at stake nor did it 
correctly analyze the nation’s history to determine whether the right 
was deeply rooted.93 The Court did look at the history of anti-
sodomy laws, but there was no mention whatsoever of whether the 
right to engage in sodomy was deeply rooted in this nation’s 
history.94 The Court simply stated that the state had no legitimate 
interest in enacting the anti-sodomy law, and thus it was 
unconstitutional. According to Justice Scalia and many 
commentators, these statements implicitly admit that the right was 
only due rational basis scrutiny.95 
This confusion of the issues by the Lawrence Court has led other 
courts to conclude that where the right to sexual privacy is at issue, 
no Glucksberg-type analysis is needed.96 For example, in Reliable 
Consultants, while addressing the classification—whether 
fundamental or not—of the right to sexual privacy, the court 
reasoned, “The Supreme Court did not address the classification, nor 
do we need to do so . . . .”97 The implication of this statement was 
that the court did not apply either strict scrutiny or rational basis 
scrutiny to the right at issue. The Reliable Consultants court erred in 
 
 88. Id. at 728 & n.20. 
 89. Id. at 722. 
 90. Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 91. Id. at 767 n.9 (Souter, J., concurring); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 92. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766–67. 
 93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008).  
 97. Id. 
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holding that it was unnecessary to determine which level of scrutiny 
the right to sexual privacy should be granted. 
This was never the holding of Lawrence. Lawrence did not 
explicitly overrule any case besides Bowers.98 To hold that a 
Glucksberg-type analysis is no longer needed to establish a 
fundamental right for substantive due process jurisprudence would 
be to overstate and misinterpret Lawrence. Additionally, the 
conclusion that Lawrence overruled any aspect of Glucksberg by 
implication goes against the Court’s instructions. The Supreme 
Court has instructed lower courts to not conclude that a more recent 
case impliedly overrules earlier precedents.99 Thus, the court in 
Reliable Consultants erred in concluding that a Glucksberg-type 
analysis was no longer needed for determining the specific level of 
scrutiny due laws implicating sexual privacy. And, as will be seen 
below, the court in Williams VI was correct in treating the right to 
sexual privacy as only a rational basis right. 
2. The right to sexual privacy is only a rational basis right 
A proper analysis of the right to sexual privacy at issue in Reliable 
Consultants and Williams VI dictates that it be treated only as a 
rational basis right for two reasons. First, to treat it as a fundamental 
right would be to ignore the Court’s reluctance to create a broad 
fundamental right to sexual privacy.100 To the extent that Lawrence 
may have created a right to sexual privacy, it was limited to the 
specific right at issue in the case—that is, to engage in sexual activity 
with someone of the same sex. Second, the Court properly exercised 
its discretion in Lawrence by not explicitly creating a broad right to 
sexual privacy.  
Only a limited number of “fundamental rights” exist for 
purposes of substantive due process analysis.101 Those rights are 
limited to personal decisions relating to “marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”102 
None of those rights specifically includes the rights at issue in 
Reliable Consultants and the Williams cases. In fact, the Court has 
 
 98. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 99. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). 
 100. See Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 745 n.32. 
 101. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 102. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)). 
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never determined that a broad “right to sexual privacy” is a 
fundamental right for substantive due process analysis.  
The Court has had numerous opportunities to create such a 
fundamental right, but each time has decided to define the right 
more narrowly so as to not encompass all sexual activity.103 For 
example, in Carey v. Population Services, the Court was presented 
with the question of the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the 
distribution of contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen by 
anyone other than a licensed pharmacist.104 In holding that the 
statute was unconstitutional, the Court recognized a right to privacy 
that extended to an individual’s liberty to make choices regarding 
contraception.105 Thus, where the court could have established a 
right to privacy that extended to all decisions relating to sex, it 
instead limited that right to decisions related to contraception.106 
Most importantly, the Court explicitly stated:  
Contrary to the suggestion advanced in Mr. JUSTICE POWELL’s 
opinion, we do not hold that state regulation must meet this 
standard “whenever it implicates sexual freedom,” or “affect[s] 
adult sexual relations,” but only when it “burden[s] an individual’s 
right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by 
substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that 
decision.”107  
Similarly, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird narrowly defined a 
fundamental right to decide “whether to bear or beget a child” 
where it could have instead created a broad right to sexual privacy.108  
The Court had another opportunity in Lawrence, as it did in 
Carey and Eisenstadt, to create a broad right to sexual privacy.109 The 
Court, though, once again limited the scope of the right in question. 
As mentioned above, it is debatable whether or not the Court in 
 
 103. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2008) (denying 
rehearing en banc) (citing Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 
1235 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 104. Carey, 431 U.S. at 681. 
 105. Id. at 685–86. 
 106. Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1235–36.  
 107. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5 (citations omitted). The Court had previously addressed 
the Constitutionality of a statute completely banning the use of contraceptives. Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Instead of recognizing a broad right to sexual privacy, the 
Court emphasized “notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id. at 486. 
 108. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  
 109. See Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1235–36. 
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Lawrence treated the right at issue as a fundamental right.110 This 
Comment argued above that the failure of the Court to do a proper 
“fundamental right” analysis foreclosed the idea that the right in 
question was a fundamental right. But let us assume for a moment 
that Lawrence did intend to create a fundamental right. What is the 
scope of that right? 
The language of Lawrence itself limits any right recognized by 
the Court to the facts of the case and Texas statute at issue. “The 
question before the Court [was] the validity of a Texas statute 
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate sexual conduct.”111 In determining that the statute 
was unconstitutional, the Court remarked that its decision was based 
on the fact that the petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
without intervention of the government.”112 Thus, in coming to its 
conclusion, the Court in Lawrence emphasized that, although the 
case dealt with what kinds of private activities individuals could 
engage in, the decision hinged on the fact that the statute dealt with 
whom you could engage in such activities. Thus, any fundamental 
right announced by the court is not a freestanding right to sexual 
privacy, but instead the right to choose with whom you want to be 
intimate.113 
Those commentators who view Lawrence as establishing a 
fundamental right tend to agree with this narrow view of the 
fundamental right. For example, Harvard constitutional law 
professor Laurence Tribe articulated the liberty interest in Lawrence 
as the right to be free from the state “stigmatiz[ing] . . . intimate 
personal relationships between people of the same sex.”114 Other 
 
 110. See supra Part IV.A.1.  
 111. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 112. Id. at 578. 
 113. This formulation of the right comports with the holding in Griswold v. Connecticut. 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court emphasizes that it is the relationship, more than 
the action, that receives constitutional protection. For example, the Court states, “The present 
case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which . . . seeks to achieve its 
goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. . . . The very idea 
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id. at 485–86 
(emphasis added).  
 114. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 (2004). 
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commentators have come to the same conclusion.115 Thus, even if 
Lawrence created a fundamental right, it would not cover sex toy 
laws because such laws do not specifically target “intimate personal 
relationships between people of the same sex.”116 
Furthermore, the Court itself has recognized its responsibility to 
practice restraint in substantive due process analysis. In Glucksberg, 
the Court counseled, “We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care 
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed 
into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.”117 The 
Court also recognized its longstanding reluctance “to expand the 
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for 
responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and 
open-ended.”118 Accordingly, the Court in interpreting its own 
decision in Lawrence will be hesitant to recognize a broad 
fundamental right to sexual privacy because doing so might 
unnecessarily replace the views of legislatures with the “policy 
preferences of the Members of [the] Court.”119 
Thus, because the right to sexual privacy has never been held to 
be a broad fundamental right, the statute at issue in Reliable 
Consultants and the Williams cases are only due rational basis 
scrutiny. 
B. Public Morality as a Rational Basis 
Having determined that sex toy statutes are to be given rational 
basis scrutiny because they do not implicate any fundamental rights, 
the question turns to whether such statutes are rationally related to 
any legitimate governmental interest.120 The only governmental 
interest asserted by states such as Alabama and Texas in enacting 
these laws is public morality.121 There is no dispute that if public 
morality were a legitimate governmental interest then it would be 
 
 115. See Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 
1862, 1868–75 (2006). 
 116. Tribe, supra note 114, at 1904. 
 117. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1997)). 
 120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 121. Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1286 (N.D. Ala. 1999). 
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rationally related to a prohibition on the sale of sex toys. The 
question becomes, then, whether bare public morality is still a 
legitimate governmental interest. If public morality is a legitimate 
governmental interest then the laws are constitutional. This 
Comment argues that the laws are constitutional for two reasons. 
First, history is replete with examples of the Court upholding the 
ability of legislatures to legislate morals. Second, the sale of sex toys 
is a public activity as opposed to the private interactions between 
individuals at issue in Lawrence.122  
1. History of morals legislation 
The Reliable Consultant court’s decision to read Lawrence as 
eliminating public morality as a rational basis completely contradicts 
hundreds of years of Supreme Court jurisprudence explicitly 
upholding such as a rational basis. As Justice Scalia mentioned in his 
concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,  
there is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared that 
Thoreauvian “you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-
injure-someone-else” beau ideal—much less for thinking it was 
written into the Constitution. . . . Our society prohibits, and all 
human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they 
harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional 
phrase, “contra bonos mores,” i.e., immoral. . . . While there may be 
great diversity of view on whether various of these prohibitions 
should exist . . . , there is no doubt that, absent specific 
constitutional protection for the conduct involved, the 
Constitution does not prohibit them simply because they regulate 
“morality.”123  
There is a long history of the Court explicitly mentioning morals as a 
legitimate basis upon which a legislature can enact laws, and this line 
of cases remains good law even in light of Lawrence. 
 
 122. To the extent that some statutes, including that at issue in Texas, forbid even the 
lending or gratuitously giving of obscene devices, this second argument breaks down. See 
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus, this Comment 
does not argue that this specific provision is constitutional. Nevertheless, the court in Reliable 
Consultants focused very little on the lending of obscene devices, and thus when this 
Comment addresses the “Texas statute” it is referencing the provisions banning the sale of 
obscene devices. 
 123. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 574–75 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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The power to legislate in the moral realm has traditionally been 
regarded as part of the state’s police power.124 In 1923, the Supreme 
Court, in the well-known case Meyer v. Nebraska, recognized the 
duty of the government to promote morality: “That the state may do 
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its 
citizens, physically, mentally and morally is clear; but the individual 
has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”125 Thus, as 
of early twentieth century, morals legislation was an acceptable 
practice. The Court did recognize, however, that morals legislation 
can extend only as far as it does not infringe on a fundamental right 
of the citizens.126 As the right at issue here is not a fundamental 
right, sex toy statutes would have clearly been constitutional over 
100 years ago. 
The Court continued to support the idea of morals legislation for 
most of the century. In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, the Court 
stated: 
The police power may be exerted in the form of state legislation 
where otherwise the effect may be to invade rights guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment only when such legislation bears a real 
and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some 
other phase of the general welfare.127  
A quarter of a century later the Court echoed its previous 
acceptance of morals legislation. “Public safety, public health, 
morality, peace and quiet, law and order—these are some of the 
more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the 
police power to municipal affairs.”128 
In the latter part of the century some specific examples of morals 
legislation came before the Court. Surprisingly, the Court upheld the 
laws even though they were based substantially on a view of morality 
and impacted conduct by consenting adults. In Paris Adult Theatre I 
v. Slaton the Court was presented with the question of whether 
Georgia could regulate the display of obscene materials in a private, 
 
 124. In 1885, the Court in Barbier v. Connolly mentioned that a state can make 
regulations “to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people.” 
113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). 
 125. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111–12 (1928) (emphasis added). 
 128. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (emphasis added). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:02:10 PM 
1369 Unraveling Lawrence’s Concerns About Legislated Morality 
 1389 
adult theater.129 There was no question that it was proper exercise of 
the police power to prohibit the display of these kinds of films to 
minors.130 However, the Court came to the surprising conclusion 
that “the States have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in 
obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene material in 
places of public accommodation, including so-called ‘adult’ theaters 
from which minors are excluded.”131 The Court emphasized the fact 
that conduct involving consenting adults is not always beyond state 
regulation, reasoning that a morals law cannot go solely to what 
society considers “wrong” or “sinful” but suggesting instead that it 
must promote the state’s right to “maintain a decent society.”132 
Thus, Paris Adult Theatre upheld morals legislation, even where it 
impacts the activities of private, consenting adults, but only so long 
as the conduct impacted has a public or commercial element.133 
The Court faced a similar law in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.134 In 
Barnes, the Court addressed a public indecency statute that required 
dancers at adult entertainment establishments to wear pasties and a 
G-string.135 The statute at issue was a morals law in that it merely 
“reflect[ed] moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude 
among strangers in public places.”136 Nevertheless, a plurality of the 
Court found the statute “clearly within the constitutional power of 
the State,” reasoning that it furthered a substantial government 
interest in protecting order and morality.137  
Thus, the Court, in Paris Adult Theatre and Barnes, has, within 
the last twenty-five years, upheld legislation passed to protect only 
the “morality” and order of society. The Court has put limits on this 
kind of legislation—including the requirement that there be some 
“public” aspect of the conduct and that the legislation not violate a 
fundamental right of citizens—but these cases upheld morals 
legislation similar to that struck down in Lawrence. Interestingly, 
 
 129. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 50–51 (1973). 
 130. Id. at 53. 
 131. Id. at 69. 
 132. Id. (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 135. Id. at 572. 
 136. Id. at 568. 
 137. Id. at 567. 
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although Lawrence expressed displeasure with morals legislation, 
neither Paris Adult Theatre nor Barnes was overruled by the Court. 
This strong history of acceptance of morals legislation provides 
the strongest support of the constitutionality of sex toy statutes. Like 
the obscene material statute in Paris Adult Theatre, the sex toy 
statutes at issue here regulate conduct by consenting adults. But, also 
like the obscene material statute, sex toy statutes have a “public” 
aspect. In fact, the private use of sex toys is not prohibited.138 
Instead, most statutes only prohibit the sale of these kinds of items at 
public stores—akin to the prohibition of obscene films at public 
theaters. The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining a “decent 
society,”139 and regulating the commercial sale of sex toys—like 
regulating the display of obscene films—is rationally related to that 
interest. 
Thus, because promotion of order and morality remains a 
legitimate government interest—especially where some sort of public 
activity is involved—and sex toy laws involve public, commercial 
activity and do not implicate a fundamental right, such laws are 
constitutional. 
2. Distinguishing Lawrence 
The court in Reliable Consultants did not find sex toy statutes 
analogous to the kinds of statutes at issue in Paris Adult Theatre and 
Barnes. Instead, because sexual activity is implicated by sex toy 
statutes, the court found Lawrence to be most analogous.140 Because 
Lawrence explicitly stated that public morality was an insufficient 
justification for the sodomy statute, public morality was also an 
insufficient justification for a sex toy statute.141 
This direct application of Justice Kennedy’s statement that 
morals alone do not justify laws prohibiting certain practices,142 
though, is an improper expansion of the Lawrence holding for two 
reasons. First, the sex toy statutes have a commercial element that 
was not present in Lawrence. Second, to expand the Lawrence 
 
 138. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 139. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (quoting Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). 
 140. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744. 
 141. Id. at 745. 
 142. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:02:10 PM 
1369 Unraveling Lawrence’s Concerns About Legislated Morality 
 1391 
holding would be to diminish the importance of the Court’s holding 
as it relates to homosexual conduct. Because Lawrence does not 
apply directly to these statutes and because, as discussed above, 
public morality can be a sufficient justification on which to enact a 
law, Justice Scalia’s fear that we have seen “the end of all morals 
legislation”143 was unfounded. 
 
a. Commercial nature of the statute. In holding that states have a 
legitimate interest in regulating the exhibition of obscene materials 
in places of public accommodation, the Court in Paris Adult Theatre 
emphasized the idea that morals legislation is more likely to be 
upheld where public activity is involved.144 The court in Reliable 
Consultants ignored this concept and instead decided that, because 
sexual activity was implicated by the statute at issue, Lawrence was 
the most appropriate case to apply.145 Although the statute 
prohibited only the sale of sex toys, the court concluded that “[a]n 
individual who wants to legally use a safe sexual device during private 
intimate moments alone or with another is unable to legally purchase 
a device in Texas, which heavily burdens a constitutional right.”146 
The court continued, “This conclusion is consistent with the 
decisions in Carey and Griswold, where the Court held that 
restricting commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the 
exercise of individual rights.”147  
In short, the argument is that although the statute at issue 
prohibited only public, commercial conduct—the sale of obscene 
devices—because the restriction on the sale of these devices strongly 
burdens their use, the statute implicates protected private activity 
and not just commercial activity. The court cited Carey v. Population 
Services and Griswold v. Connecticut to support its point.148 Although 
the Reliable Consultants court might be correct that the statute 
would be unconstitutional in light of Lawrence if it did in fact 
impermissibly burden private sexual activity, the court was incorrect 
in concluding that Carey and Griswold applied here. Because the 
statute in this case impacts only public, commercial activity, this case 
 
 143. See id. at 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 144. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69. 
 145. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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is distinguishable from those Supreme Court precedents and is 
constitutional. 
In Carey, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a New York 
law that, among other things, prohibited distribution of 
contraceptives to anyone over sixteen by anyone other than a 
licensed pharmacist.149 The Court struck down the statute as 
impermissibly burdening “the right of the individual to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.”150 The Court reasoned that “[r]estrictions on 
the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to 
make such decisions.”151 Thus, Carey stands for the proposition that, 
where a law restricts commercial transactions related to an individual 
right, the law must be analyzed as though it directly impacts that 
right.152 
The issues in Reliable Consultants and the Williams cases are 
distinguishable from those in Carey, though. The right at issue in 
Carey related to a fundamental right to not have unwarranted 
governmental intrusion in the decision whether or not to have a 
child. The Court in Carey, in making its decision, cited to Griswold 
v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade and its progeny.153 Like Carey, those 
cases dealt with fundamental rights—the right to be free from 
governmental intrusion in the decision whether to conceive a child 
and in a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.154  
The right implicated by sex toy laws—a right to broad sexual 
freedom—is not a fundamental right in the mold of those at issue in 
Carey, Griswold and Roe.155 In fact, the Court in Carey explicitly 
mentioned that its holding did not apply to state regulation 
whenever it implicated sexual freedom: “[W]e do not hold that state 
regulation must meet this standard ‘whenever it implicates sexual 
freedom,’ or ‘affect[s] adult sexual relations,’ but only when it 
‘burden[s] an individual’s right to decide to prevent conception or 
 
 149. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
 150. Id. at 687 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra Part IV.A. 
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terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of 
effectuating that decision.”156 
Furthermore, the policy considerations at issue in Carey are not 
present here. In making its decision, the Court in Carey emphasized 
the fact that the statute in issue restricted the number of 
“distribution channels to a small fraction of the total number of 
possible retail outlets, reduce[d] the opportunity for privacy of 
selection and purchase, and lessen[ed] the possibility of price 
competition.”157 The sex toy laws at issue in Reliable Consultants and 
Williams do not produce the outcomes listed in Carey. These laws 
do not prohibit the purchase of obscene devices online, which are 
surely for sale in other states. Surely only a small number of physical 
stores sell these obscene devices as compared to the number of 
online retailers. Thus, eliminating the physical stores does not reduce 
the distribution channels to a small fraction of the total number of 
possible retail outlets. In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
many individuals would prefer to purchase these kinds of devices 
online regardless of whether or not they are also available in local 
retail stores. Online retail, as opposed to public purchases, also 
promotes privacy in selection and purchase. Last, with the number of 
overall online outlets, price competition is not an issue. Thus, 
applying Carey to the facts of Reliable Consultants and Williams VI 
so as to analyze those cases as directly infringing the right to sexual 
privacy would be to impermissibly extend its holding. 
Because these statutes must be analyzed under a state’s power to 
regulate commercial activity, the right at issue in this case is not the 
same right to sexual privacy at issue in Lawrence. Lawrence 
specifically excluded public actions from its holding that public 
morality is an insufficient basis on which to enact laws.158 
Particularly, the Court said,  
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not 
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether 
 
 156. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5. 
 157. Id. at 689. 
 158. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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the government must give formal recognition to any relationship 
that homosexual persons seek to enter.159 
The public sale of obscene devices surely constitutes “public 
conduct” not covered by Lawrence as described by the Court.160 
Instead, the law at issue, as discussed previously,161 is more similar to 
the law at issue in Paris Adult Theatre, which was upheld because 
the state had a legitimate interest in regulating commerce as it 
related to obscene materials.162 In that case, public morality—as it 
related to the state’s promotion of decency—was held to be a 
legitimate government interest.163 Likewise, the statute here can be 
upheld because the state has a legitimate interest in promoting 
decency by forbidding the public sale of sex toys. The Lawrence 
holding, relating to purely private conduct, cannot be applied 
directly, as it was done in Reliable Consultants, to conclude that the 
statute was unconstitutional. “There is nothing ‘private’ or 
‘consensual’ about the advertising and sale of a dildo.”164 
 
b. Importance of the homosexual element in Lawrence. To extend 
Lawrence to cover the sex toy laws at issue would be to both ignore 
the reasons it was decided and to diminish its importance and 
significance to gay rights. Part of the difficulty in applying Lawrence 
to laws banning the sale of sex toys is that Lawrence left a number of 
questions unanswered. Courts, including the Reliable Consultants 
court, have misinterpreted the Lawrence holding in a number of 
areas, the most relevant of which is the extent of the right in 
question.  
The question addressed by the Court in Lawrence was “the 
validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the 
same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.”165 Although 
the Court in some instances mentions a broad right to sexual privacy, 
in most instances it frames the right in terms of not what you can do 
but with whom you can do it. Thus, there is a strong argument that 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 162. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1237 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 165. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
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Lawrence only established a right to engage in sexual activity with 
someone of the same sex without unnecessary governmental 
intrusion. Therefore, Lawrence does not apply to the sex toy statutes 
because those statutes do not implicate the right to engage in sexual 
activity with someone of the same sex. 
No fewer than ten times does the Court in Lawrence frame the 
issue as the right for two people of the same sex to engage in sexual 
activity—and not as a broader freedom of sexual intimacy. For 
example, the Court, in describing the statutes at issue, stated: “The 
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or 
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of 
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”166 The 
Court went on to argue: “When sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to 
make this choice.”167 At this point, the Court made no mention of a 
broader right to sexual freedom to engage in any activity without 
governmental intrusion—only the freedom to choose a sexual 
partner of the same sex. 
In fact, the majority of the Court’s historical analysis focused 
directly on laws limiting the sexual freedoms of homosexuals.168 For 
example, in concluding its discussion of society’s historical and 
traditional rejection of homosexual practices on moral and religious 
grounds, the Court stated, “The issue is whether the majority may 
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole 
society through operation of the criminal law.”169  
It would be strange if the Court were to announce a broad right 
to sexual freedom without governmental intrusion and without 
analyzing the history behind that freedom. The Court itself 
recognized, “History and tradition are the starting point . . . of the 
substantive due process inquiry.”170 Based on the Court’s own 
analysis, without ever touching on the history and tradition of a 
broad right to sexual freedom, the Court did not make a sufficient 
 
 166. Id. at 567. 
 167. Id. (emphasis added). 
 168. See id. at 568–71. 
 169. Id. at 571. 
 170. Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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due process inquiry to announce such a right—one that would cover 
the sex toy laws at issue. 
The Court’s ultimate conclusion rested on its rejection of Bowers 
and how the Bowers decision particularly impacted homosexuals: 
“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers 
would deny them this right.”171 It went on, “The central holding of 
Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be 
addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of 
homosexual persons.”172 Thus, the primary purpose in the Court 
overruling Bowers was to promote the rights and autonomy of 
homosexual persons. There was hardly a mention in the opinion of a 
right to sexual freedom that extends beyond this holding. The Court 
does conclude with the statement, “The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”173 This statement alone, 
however, is insufficient to create a broad right of sexual freedom for 
all individuals in all instances. 
The kind of analysis used in the Lawrence opinion is not 
uncommon. William N. Eskridge, Jr., a Yale Law School professor 
and co-author of the Cato Institute’s amicus brief in Lawrence,174 
argues: 
The key to understanding Lawrence—and all its doctrinal 
complexities—is the Supreme Court’s recognition that American 
democratic pluralism must meet the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgendered (LGBT) rights movement at least halfway. After a 
century of discrimination and persecution, lesbians, gay men, and 
bisexuals have demonstrated through their lives that traditional 
state antigay discrimination and persecution were unjust. . . . But 
contrary to the dissenters, Lawrence only sets a new floor for gay 
people, and not the same floor that straight Americans can take for 
 
 171. Id. at 574. 
 172. Id. at 575. 
 173. Id. at 578. 
 174. William N. Eskridge – Profile, Jr., http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/WEskridge. 
htm. The Court relied on scholarly articles and the amicus brief written by Professor Eskridge 
in making its decision in ruling in favor of the petitioners in Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 567–68, 571–72.  
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granted. Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing 
more than, a jurisprudence of tolerance.175  
Under this reasoning, to argue that Lawrence came out the way 
it did because all people have a broad right to sexual freedom may 
diminish the meaning of Lawrence to the LGBT community and 
remand homosexuals back to a position of discrimination and 
persecution. 
Thus, because the freedom announced in Lawrence was 
specific—the freedom to engage in sexual activity with someone of 
the same sex—to apply it directly to the facts of Reliable Consultants 
or Williams VI would be improper. Those cases involve not the right 
to engage in a relationship with someone of the same sex, but 
instead simply the right to purchase obscene items that could 
potentially be used in such a relationship. The Reliable Consultants 
court, therefore, erred in holding the statute unconstitutional in 
light of Lawrence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has yet to address Justice Kennedy’s 
statement in Lawrence that public morality is never a legitimate 
government interest so as to satisfy rational basis scrutiny. A circuit 
split has emerged in an effort to interpret this statement in the realm 
of the sale of obscene adult items like sex toys. Although the Court 
may adopt Justice Kennedy’s position that public morality is 
insufficient to allow a legislature to control what goes on in the 
private bedroom, the holding of Lawrence only goes that far. This 
Comment argues that, where the conduct prohibited is not purely 
private, but has a commercial element, and where the rights 
implicated are not fundamental rights, public morality remains a 
legitimate government interest that satisfied rational basis scrutiny.  
To extend the Lawrence holding to apply to a legislature 
criminalizing only the sale of adult items, as was done in Reliable 
Consultants, would be impermissible for a number of reasons. First, 
only rational basis scrutiny applies and not any sort of strict scrutiny. 
As such, there is a lower threshold of constitutionality for these kinds 
of laws. Second, history has established morality as a legitimate 
government interest in many cases. These cases have never been 
 
 175. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to 
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2004). 
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overruled and remain good law, even in light of the Lawrence 
decision. Next, the right at issue here involves public, commercial 
activity, which was explicitly disclaimed in Lawrence. The Court’s 
holding in Carey is distinguishable, and thus the laws should be 
analyzed as infringing only the right to sell obscene items and not 
the more broad right to sexual freedom. Last, the Lawrence decision 
was heavily influenced by the fact that gay rights were involved—and 
such rights were not at issue in either Williams VI or Reliable 
Consultants.  
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